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16 Abstract
It is now possible to place relatively large communications satellites in geostationary
orbit, using the Shuttle. Other advanced technoloy, such as the use of 30/20 GHz (Ka) band has
reached or is near the point of commercial use. The satellite industry, however, is in a state
of transition from the early state with few operators, to a later state with many diverse operators
and correspondingly many satellites. It is not clear if or how advanced technology will be
incorporated into this enviroment.
This report postulates one set of scenarios, based on a set of traffic demand forecasts
derived from previous contracts performed by Western Union and ITT. The scenarios use a demand-
driven model to launch new satellites, with other limits on the available (and economical)
technology. The results using a Low Traffic Forecast show a continuing oversupply of transponders.
However, the scenarios using a High Traffic Forecast show that considerable advanced technology
including the use of 30/20GHz will be needed to satisfy demand.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.0 Task 1
The basic aim of Task 1 is to massage the forecasts provided by
Western Union and ITT in order to obtain a forecast of transponder requirements
including various factors. The WU and ITT forecasts are of satellite addressable
traffic. This merely postulates the fraction of total traffic that is susceptible to
satellite carriage. The end product of Task 1 purports to be a forecast of traffic
that actually will be carried by satellite. Certain assumptions about system
configurations are also implicit in this process.
The factors that we included in Task 1 are, in order: interpolation of
the WU and ITT baseline year values to produce yearly figures; estimation of
satellite capture; effects of peak-hours and the time-zone staggering of peak
hours; circuit requirements for acceptable grade of service; capacity of satellite
transponders, including various compression methods where applicable; and require-
ments for spare transponders in orbit. As part of Task 1, we also estimated the
geographical distribution of traffic requirements.
These manipulations were applied to the basic forecasts to yield the
gross, in-orbit transponder forecases shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Summary
Table 1 illustrates the effect that various processes in Task 1 have had
on the base forecasts. We have illustrated this with the low traffic forecast for
1990. The basic satellite-addressable forecast is considered to be the normalized
value of 1.0. The table shows the relative value after processing through the
indicated stage. Thus, the combined effects of previous stages are included in
these figures. In general, the capture fraction calculation had the most effect.
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Table 1
Normalized Effects on the
Low Forecast - 1990
Stage Voice
Video
Data Conferencing TV
Base Forecast
(satellite-addressable) 1.0
After Satellite Capture 0.21
Includes Time Zone
Effects 0.144
Includes Grade-of-
Service Factors 0.165
Includes Transponder
Spares 0.205
1.0
0.37
0.546
0.546
0.682
1.0
0.90
0.84
1.074
1.15
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.07
2.0 Task 2
Task 2 required the formation of a model for the satellite industry. Of
course, this model was primarily used to estimate the response of the industry to
the traffic forecasts of Task 1.
Various factors were unknown; we made assumptions that in some cases
were varied to form different scenarios. Since we implemented the model using a
computer program, other variations could be readily evaluated. We deliberatly
kept the number limited to avoid flooding the reader with data, much of which
would be useless.
Supply and Demand
An important consideration is the availability of orbital slots at the
desired frequency band or bands. We have recently seen what a great effect such a
limitation can have on the plans of would-be system operators. Depending on the
needs of the customer base to be addressed, there may be one band which is more
desirable than others; however, if slot is not available, then the operator will be
out of luck.
In Table 2 the longitude limits which we used in this study are shown
together with the number of slots available at two degree spacing at each
frequency band.
We have calculated the available supply (without launching any as-yet
unannounced satellites) in two ways: first, using only the satellites that have been
approved, and second, using all satellites for which we have information.* The
figures also include random failures of transponders, but don't include-relatively
recent events such as the failure of twelve transponders on SATCOM II (which is
almost dead anyway). These projections are plotted in Figures 3 and 4, along with
the Low and High traffic forecasts respectively.
*Note that several of the most recent group of satellites were not included. This
work was done before their applications were filed.
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Table 2
Orbital Arc
Number Orbital
Band of Slots Range
6/4 35* 59°-101°
119° - 143°
14/12 34 59°-105°
120°-139°
30/20 23 75°-119°
*Based on 1983 assignments, these are actually only 30
slots. The 35 figure assumes all 2° spacing.
Practical Satellite Efficiency
In constructing an actual multi-beam satellite, we would not necessarily
have to provide the maximum possible capacity per beam, but could use the
assumed traffic distribution to tailor the satellite to the beam loading. That is, if
at saturation a given beam will only carry 2 transponders, then we only install 2
transponders for that beam. Thus, although the efficiency with which the beam
pattern is used wiH be low, the efficiency with which the physical facilities of the
satellite are used will be much higher.
This can best be illustrated by some examples. These are shown in
Table 3.
Table 3
Satellite Capacity Examples
Band
C or Ku
30/20
C or Ku
30/20
C or Ku
30/20
C or Ku
30/20
CNet
24
24
36
36
48
48
96
96
N
1
10
18
10
27
10
96
10
Efficiency
T?
100%
49%
24%
49%
22%
49%
13%
49%
Gross
Capacity
24
29
45
41
61
53
144
101
Satellite Industry Scenarios
The model is traffic-driven, and includes a number of assumptions about
the distribution of traffic among the various frequency bands. Because of these
assumptions, we have run the model using several scenarios, varying the assumed
behavior to show the sensitivity of the results. Virtually all of the scenarios
converge to systems which make use of multiple-spot-beam antennas and/or the
30/20 GHz band. The specific traffic distributions and satellite constellations don't
all converge, however, and the difference can provide some illustration of the
effects of different constraints.
Scenario Results
Detailed results for all scenarios are too lengthy for inclusion in this
Summary. Tables 4 through 6 and Figures 5 through 7 were chosen as a covering
range of realistic conditions.
:=.i IMMARY FOR
CASE #1 — SOME DEMAND FOR EACH BAND — NO LIMIT ON C-BAND OR \ U-BAND
CAPACITY EXCEPT STRICTLY TECHNICAL. AS ESTIMATED.
LOW TRAFFIC FORECAST
FREQUENC V BAND
C-BAND I-U-BAND PA-BAND
MAX I MUM SATELL I TE ( TRANSPONDERS ; :
YEAR LAUNCHED:
FIRST MULT I BEAM SATELITE IN:
GROSS CAPACITY'
1 930
1990
2000
37 37 c.5
1 9 9 4 1 '•' '-' 9 2 0 0 0
1 9'-' 4 1 '~i~>'~> 1 c'92
1 28 0 0
672 744 O
'-n7 842 180
NET CAPACITY
1980
1990
2000
1 ~"'Oj_'_*
672
812
744
0
o
164
AVERAGE CAPACITY
1980
rr'90
2000
19
24
u
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SUMMARY FOR
CASE #1 — SOME DEMAND FOR EACH BAND — NO LIMIT ON C-BAND OR KU-BAND
CAPACITY EXCEPT STRICTLY TECHNICAL AS ESTIMATED.
HIGH TRAFFIC FORECAST
FREQUENCY BAND
C-BAND KU-BAND KA-BAND
MAXIMUM SATELLITE (TRANSPONDERS):
YEAR LAUNCHED:
FIRST MULT I BE AM SATELITE IN:
GROSS CAPACITY
1 980
1990
2000
58
1996
1 992
128
672
1329
61
1 999
1 996
0
744
1 1 48
84
2000
1 992
O
0
641
NET CAPACITY
1980
1990
20OO
1 ii'"t
i>72
1 133
0
744
1016
0
0
595
AVERAGE CAPACITY
1980
1990
2000
19
24
38
0
22
34
0
0
58
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SUMMARY FOR
CASE #1C — SOME DEMAND FOR EACH BAND — 24 TRANSPONDER LIMIT AT C-BAND
36 TRANSPONDER LIMIT AT KU-BAND
HIGH TRAFFIC: FORECAST
FREQUENCY BAND
C-BAND KU-BAND KA-BAND
MAXIMUM SATELLITE (TRANSPONDERS):
YEAR LAUNCHED:
FIRST MULT I BE AM SATELITE IN:
GROSS CAPACITY
1 980
1990
2000
NET CAPACITY
1980
1990
2000
AVERAGE CAPACITY
1980
1990
2000
24
1986
0
128
672
840
128
672
840
19
24
24
45
1995
1995
0
744
1233
0
744
1075
0
22
36
86
1998
1 992
0
0
908
0
0
849
0
0
65
Table 6
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3.0 Earth Station Forecasts
The growth of the earth station population is roughly proportional to
the traffic, varying according to the kind of traffic (i.e. — CPS or trunking or TV,
etc.). The number' of earth stations per transponder of traffic has historically been
an increasing function with time, and we expect this to continue within reasonable
limits. For TVRO or very thin route stations, the practical limits are quite high or
non-existant. However, for stations which carry a significant amount of traffic
and require access to one or more transponders on a continuous basis, there are
fairly low limits.
The earth station size mix will also vary according to traffic category.
This is partly an economic decision, since a smaller earth station of less complexity
and lower price will be needed to make lighter traffic economical to carry.
However, the consideration of physical placement is very important for CPS
services. This is especially so at Ku-band and 30/20 GHz, since these stations will
be located in metropolitan areas (as well as elsewhere) and hence must be as
unobtrusive as possible.
Since the various scenarios produce somewhat different distributions of
traffic among the frequency bands, we estimated the earth station requirements
for each one. Summary results of earth station requirements are shown in Table
7.
16
Table 7
Scenarios
Low Traffic
1
2
3
High Traffic
1
2
3
IB
2B
3B
1C
2C
3C
Total Earth Station
the Year
C-band
3,384
5,887
4,830
10,180
13,167
11,492
7,477
7,949
7,870
7,477
7,949
7,870
Estimates for
2000
Ku-band
3,168
1,223
2,281
11,460
9,830
11,498
9,377
8,974
9,053
11,953
11,949
12,467
Ka-band
556
0
0
5,837
4,478
4,487
10,621
9,388
9,388
8,047
7,579
7,137
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4.0 Economic Analysis - Task 2
Satellite communications has developed into a rather large business,
with total investment in current satellites of over $1 billion in the U.S. domestic
systems alone. According to a recent article, the worldwide communications
satellite market is approaching $3 billion per year, excluding ground segment. Thus
it is important that we examine the effect of our postulated future satellites on
the overall market, in economic terms.
The cost of satellites launched during each scenario run in Task 2 was
estimated using the SAMSO cost model. Launch costs were estimated based on the
weight of the satellite and the costs of known launch vehicles. All these figures
were expressed in 1983 dollars to provide a common standard.
We also estimated costs for the example earth station configurations
that we used, using data of our own, plus information developed by Western Union.
Table 8 shows the total cumulative costs of meeting the earth station
requirements postulated in Section 11. We have not included costs for networking
of trunk and shared CPS earth stations in these costs.
Space segment costs are also shown. Investments for known satellites
(i.e. - not generated by the program) are not included.
18
Table 8
Cumulative Investment Costs
for Scenario Runs
(millions of 1984 dollars)
Scenario
Space
Segment
Ground
Segment
Low Traffic
1
2
3
7,545
8,072
7,469
4,797
4,576
4,682
High Traffic
1
2
3
10,528
11,239
10,340
14,270
14,150
14,340
IB
2B
3B
13,143
12,287
12,287
13,868
13,337
13,330
1C
2C
3C
11,506
11,500
10,330
14,203
14,264
14,315
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5.0 Summary and Conslusions
This report has covered a rather wide range of topics relating to
satellite communications in the U.S. To one extent or another, of course, the
various results depend on one another and on assumptions that we made during the
course of the study. Some of these assumptions are more arguable than others, for
instance, our selection of data rate for a CPS transponder, and our speculations
about the courses of action of the several long-haul carriers using satellite
transmission. Given the traffic forecasts that we began with, however, we are of
the opinion that no reasonable variation of assumptions would change the magni-
tude of either the high or low traffic forecast by more than a factor of about two.
Conclusions from the Scenarios
With the currently-mandated 2 degree spacing at C-band and Ku-band,
the scenario runs clearly indicate that the average capacity needed at each band is
relatively modest for the Low traffic cases, and feasible, but rather advanced for
the High traffic. It's worth noting that the 2B and 3B scenarios used every slot,
even at 30/20 GHz. However, it would be instructive to investigate different ways
in which this capacity might be provided. The scenario runs present one way, but
not the only way, in which satellites might be launched to satisfy demand. The
various possibilities might be loosely classified as: Multiple Small Satellites (as in
the scenarios); Multiple Hybrids of modest specific capacity; Rapid Transition to
Large Satellites.
The Role of Satellites in the Overall Communications Structure
Satellites are, and will remain, ideally suited for broadcast applications.
It is hard to conceive of a development in terrestrial communications technology
that would undermine this advantage, at least in the United States. There are a
number of countries whose physical extent is limited enough that it is actually less
expensive for them to install a terrestrial broadcast system (for TV and radio) than
to launch a satellite or even share a satellite for DBS purposes. However, our large
land area and common interests, along with our seemingly inexhaustible appetite
for programming, will ensure a continuing role for satellites in broadcast. But
what of point-to-point communications?
20
In point-to-point communications, satellites have been used mainly to
enable the "great leap" whereby new communications modes are offered, or
conventional modes expanded or opened to competition. This leap is generally
necessary because terrestrial communications systems suffer from a "critical
mass" or "critical density" syndrome. Until and unless the density of users becomes
relatively high, the distance-sensitivity of terrestial links makes the cost of the
system exorbitant. An added user is likely to cause the system to incur a very high
added cost. Once the density of users is high enough, the incremental cost per user
drops and continues to drop as the user base expands. In a satellite system,
different rules prevail.
An additional satellite user always incurs (roughly) the same incre-
mental cost no matter where he is located. The network can therefore add service
points and grow without penalizing any particular users with high costs. This
feature makes satellites ideal for new systems or modes of communications, where
users are initially few and far between. This is why satellites have been used for
trans-oceanic communications, greatly expanding the available facilities and
improving quality, and for new services such as wideband data communications and
videoconferencing.
As such services become better established, and the density of users
increases, terrestrial technologies begin to encroach. This process can readily be
seen at work today. It is our view that several factors will keep satellites viable
for many years. Among these are: the continuing existance of remote users, the
competitive environment in the U.S., and the economic advantage of existing
facilities.
Footnote; The Year 2000
The year 2000 has become something of a touchstone for long-range
planning. Indeed, one sometimes gets the impression that there is a veil drawn
across time which prevents us from seeing beyond that date. The usual short-term
focus of commercial firms, for whom five years is "long-range", probably causes
some of the reluctance to look beyond the end of the century.
21
However, it's our opinion that some interesting things will just be
beginning to happen by the year 2000, in communications and in space generally.
We are already in a position where the firm plans of communications carriers today
wiH affect the actual events of the early 1990s. This leaves relatively little scope
for action if we limit our future vision to the year 2000. To alter the course of
events requires either enormous power acting in a short time, or a long time for
moderate influence to be effective. We respectfully note that we (and NASA) are
more likely to be in the latter position than the former. Therefore, we need to
look further and identify decision points that are within the range of our influence.
22
